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THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
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Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Nez Perce 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE CARL B. KERRICK, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Counsel for Respondent Counsel for Appellant 
Mr. Lawrence G. Wasden 
Attorney General 
Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Mr. David M. Estes 
Pro-se 
1308 loth Avenue 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
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IN THE NEZ PERCE COUNTY SECOND JUDlC 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF I 
County of NEZ PERCE ) Cause NO: CR-2007-0008507 
Plaintiff I Respondent, ) 
v, ) Motion for Disqualification Without Cause 
David M. Estes, 1 
l~omes now the defendant, David M Estes, and moves to disqualify the Honorable Greg 
/~albfleisch. pursuant to Idaho Rule of Court CR25 (a). 
/ ~ a t e d  this ~8~~ day of November 2007 
C __%7sqALer&2 
David M. Estes, Defendant 
Motion for Disqualification - 1 David M. Estes 
1308 1 om AV. 
LEWISTON. ID 
208.746.1744 
DANIEL L. SPICKLER 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting 
Erik L. Johnson 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 799-3073 
I.S.B.N. 5995 
I N  THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, I N  AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, CASE NO. CR2007-0008507 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOTION REQUESTING ADDITIONAL 
TIME TO FILE DISCOVERY 
DAVID M. ESTES, I 
Respondent. 
COMES NOW, Erik L. Johnson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Nez 
Perce County, State of Idaho, and moves the above-entitled Court for an 
order granting an additional fourteen (14) days to  provide the Defendant 
with supplemental discovery. 
This motion is based upon the grounds that the Defendant has 
requested information in  his discovery request that  is not readily attainable 
by the State. Additional t ime is necessary to  obtain said information to  
provide to  the Defendant. 
4'- DATED this % day of  November, 200 
MOTION 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
I declare under penalty of perjury that  a full, true, complete and 
correct copy of  the foregoing MOTION REQUESTING ADDITIONAL TIME TO 
FILE DISCOVERY was 
(1) - hand delivered, or  
(2) - hand delivered via court basket, or  
(3)  - sent via facsimile, or 
(4) &mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the 
United States Mail. 
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING: 
David Estes 
1308 loth Avenue 
Lewiston, I D  83501 
DATED this & day of November, 200Z. A 
MOTION 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DAVID M. ESTES, 
Defendant. 
e No. CR07-8507 
1 ORDER REGARDING 
1 DISQUALIFICATION OF 
1 MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
) 
The undersigned Magistrate Judge deems himself disqualified to preside over this case. 
Plaintiff Defendant has moved to disqualify the undersigned Magistrate Judge 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40. 
The Motion is - granted denied. 
State X Defendant has moved to disquaiifjr the under-signed Magistrate Judge 
pursuant to I.C.R. 25. 
The Motion is 4 granted denied. 
Order Regarding Disqualification 
of Magistrate Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
--Eumba// 




I Sent Valley Messenger 
Erik L. Johnson 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
David M. Bstes (Wl6U.i J)  
Pro Se 
1308 loth Avenue 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Order Regarding Disqualification 
of Magistrate Judge 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE ST$~&D 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) CASE NO. CR 07-8507 
1 
Plaintiff, ) ORDER APPOINTING 
VS. 
1 




The Honorable Greg K. Kalbfleisch, having been disqualified pursuant to Idaho Criminal 
Rule 25, the Honorable Jay P. Gaskill, with chambers in Nez Perce County, is hereby appointed 
to preside in this action. 
DATED this day of December 2007. 
% STEVEN CAYL 
Trial Court Admingkator 
Certificate of Mailing 
k 
1 hereby certify that on this day of December, 2007, a true copy of the foregoing 
was delivered to the following: 
U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid - U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
---Valley Messenger Service Valley Messenger Service 
Hand Delivery - Hand Delivery 
Facsimile Facsimile 
County Prosecutor's Office David Estess 
P.O. Box 1267 1308 10" Avenue 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telefax to Judge assigned to this case 
Lewiston, ID 83501 # 
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk of th6$%w* 
DEPUTY 
ORDER APPOINTTNG JUDGE 7 I 
IN  THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNW OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, I CASE NO. CR2007-0008507 




ORDER ALLOWING ADDITIONAL TIME 
TO FILE DISCOVERY 
Based upon the State's Motion and good cause appearing therefore, 
I T  I S  HEREBY ORDERED that the State is granted an additional fourteen (14) 
days t o  file supplemental discovery. 
DATED this \>aay of December, 2007. 
ORDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that  a true and correct copy of  the foregoing, MOTION 
REQUESTING ADDITIONAL TIME TO FILE DISCOVERY, was 
(1) - hand delivered, or 
v' (2) hand delivered via court basket, o r  
(3) sent via facsimile, or  
/mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in United States (4) - 
mail, addressed to  the following: 
David Estes 
1308 loth Avenue 
Lewiston, I D  83501 
Prosecutor's OfRce 
P. 0. Box 1267 
Lewiston, I D  83501 









17 Comes now the defendant, David M. Estes, and moves for a dismissal of the charges pending 
18 I / 
IN THE NEZ PERCE COUNTY SECOND 









County of NEZ PERCE ) Cause NO: CR-2007-0008507 
Plaintiff I Respondent, 1 
v, ) Motion to Dismiss 
) 
David M. Estes, 1 
Defendant I Appellant 












before the court in this cause. This motion is based on the following: 
I. Facts 
1.1. On 1112012007 the defendant submitted a request for production of documents. That 
request included a copy of the officers training records that show he was trained on the type of 










40 ,+% g 9 T G  ?&$z 
David M. Estes. Defendant 
1.2. The plaintiff submitted a request for an extension of time to gather the material and was 
granted a fourteen day extension. To date the aforementioned documents were not produced. 
I!. Authority 
2.1. This motion is brought pursuant to ICR 16 (e)(2). 






David M. Estes 
1308 1 om AV. 
LRNISTON, ID 
208.746.1744 
Motion to dismiss - 1 
IN TEE DIST " -  -BURT OF TBE SECOND JVDICIA- T -'RICT OF THE 
STATE L *HO, I N  AND FOR THE COUNTY \ i 
CASE TITLE id &a JUDGE 
h&EY T Y ~ ~  CLERK 
hZ"i& 
E E ~ I N G  TYPE @i7?~jA 
PLP ATTORNEY 'C 10 h YI s FPI ,E NO. 7-,%74 
DEE ATTORNEYYLCASE No- 
OTIIERS PRESENT DATE - 
TIME 
EE I T  KXOW TgAT rCHe FOLLQWIHG PROCEEDINGS WERE W ,  TO WITl 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDWO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
State of Idaho 
v. 
CASE TITLE David Estes JUDGE Jay P. Gaskill 
HEARING TYPE Court Trial CLERK Donna Evans 
PLTF ATTORNEY Erik Johnson TAPE NO. T-5505 
DEF A?TORNEY Pro Se CASE NO. CR-2007-8507 
March 31d, 2008 TIME 1O:OO AM 
IT KNOWN THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: 
\/' Erik Johnson present for State 
/ David Estes present Pro Se 
#I387 State calls John Fems 
Sworn in 
#I405 State begins direct exam 
#I570 Defendant objects re: Lidar 
#I606 Pause in tape while State looks at information provided to defendant 
#I621 State addresses court 
#I625 State ~uestions witness re: tWe of radar used at traffic stop 
#I696 State did provide defendant with the wrong. info. on the type of radar used 
#I708 Defendant makes a motion to dismiss 
State asks to proceed without radar testimony 
Court excludes any evidence re: radar 
#I725 State continues with direct exam of Fems 
#I763 State ends 
#I779 Defendant begins cross exam of Ferris 
#2292 Defendant ends 
#2296 State bepins recross 
-Witness steps down 
s --- 
State has no other witnesses 
Court finds defendant ~uiltv 
Fine and court costs total $75.00 and are due by 04-03-2008 
Recess 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
David M Estes 
1308 10th Ave 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Defendant. 
DOB: 
DL or SSN: 
Sp-or ludicial District Court, State of idah 
li. .nd For the County of Nez Perc 
1230 Main St. 




) Case No: CR-2007 
) 
) INFRACTION 




JUDGMENT HAVING r the charge against the above named defendant and for the 
penalty or fine and court d the defendant having shown good cause for a deferred 
payment; 
IT IS HEREBY AGREED that the defendant is granted a deferred payment agreement as follows: Defendant 
agrees to  pay by April 3rd, 2008. 
You are further advised that an additional statutory fee will be assessed for EACI-( partial 
payment. 
THIS CHARGE IS AN INFRACTION - YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that if you do not pay said penalty 
within the time agreed, in person or by mail to the Court, your DRIVER'S LICENSE WlLL BE SUSPENDED by 
the ldaho Transportation Department or your home state pursuant to the interstate Nonresident Violator 
Compact. 
f i  
If you cannot make the before the court to show cause 
why Your license 
Patty 0. Weeks 
FINES NOT PAiD By DUE 
DATE WlbL BE TURNED BY: 
R E ~ g g ~  TB CPLLECT~QN. 
I acknowledge receipt of this agreement and state that I have read and agreed to this terms of the agreement 
and acknowledge that I realize that MY DRIVER'S LICENSE WlLL BE SUSPENDED IF I FAIL TO MAKE 
PAYMENTS AS AGREED. - 
Defendant fl 
Infraction Deferred Payment Agreement DOC06 12/92 
IDAHO UNIFORM CITATION 
COURT DOCKET 
DATE 
o Fixed fine paid by mail 
o Defendant appeared --first appearance 
o Entered plea of admission or guilty - / 
o Infraction: Plea of admission 
o Misdemeanor: I plead guilty to the offense: 
o Paid fixed penalty or fine W " I  " 
o Sentenced by Court 
o Advised of rights, entered plea of denial or not guilty 
o Trial set for o Jury o Jury Waived o Jury NIA 
o Bail set in amount $ (misdemeanor only) 
o Continued until 
o Warrant issued -- Reason: 
o Default - failed to appear on infraction 
o Other action: 
Second Judic ia l  Dist r ic t  Court, State of Idaho 
In and  Fo r  the County  of Nez Perce 
T h e  S t a t e  o f  I daho ,  Plaintiff, 
vs. 
David M Es tes  
) JUDGMENT (VIOLATION #I) 
) Case  No :  CR-2007-0008507 
) 
The defendant having been fully advised of his constitutional and statutoiy rights, including his right to be represented 
by counsel, and the defendant having: 
o Been advised of right to court appointed counsel if indigent 
o Been represented by counsel 
o Waived counsel (name) 
o Entered a plea of admission or guilty 
Entered a plea of denial or not guiity, and has been 
$(~ound to have committed the offense 
o Found not to have committed the offense 
o Failed to appear on an infraction -- default entered 
NOW THEREFORE, Judgment is hereby entered: 
Against the defendant 
a Defendant's driving privileges are suspended for (days) (months) 
o For the defendant 
o Withheld judgment (misdemeanor only) 
For the charge of the offense of in violation o f  sect ion 149-654(2) Speed-exceed Max imum Speed Limit on 
Ci tat ion No. 1302770 Coun t  1 
THE DEFENDANT IS REBY ORDERED, to pay the following fixed penalty or fine: 
Penalty or fine r 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF NEZPERCE 
The undersigned Clerk of the above entitled court hereby certifies that 









18 1 /TO: The clerk of Court Nez Perce County 
IN THE NEZ PERCE COUNTY SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
State of Idaho ) Appellate NO: 
Plaintiff I Respondent, ) 





20 I AND TO: Erik L. Johnson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Nez Perce County Idaho 
David M. Estes, ) Notice of Appeal 
Defendant I Appellant 1 
22 1/ 1 To you and each of you take note that the defendant, David M. Estes, files this notice of 




I. Title of Action 
appeal from the Magistrate Division of the Nez Perce County court. 




39 3.1. The number assigned to the action is CR-2007-0008507 3 8 ~  I 




IV. Appellate Court 
Jay P. Gaskill presiding 




NOTICE OF APPEAL 






David M. Estes 
1308 loTH AV. 
LEWISTON, ID 
208.746.1744 
Notice of Appeal - 1 
$.I. Cont'd ) Of Idaho, In and for the County of Nez Perce. 
V. Judgment 
I. The judgment was dated March 3"', 2008. No separate judgment order was issued only a 
?ferred payment agreement which has the aforementioned date in it. 
VI. Statement of lssues 
1. This appeal is taken on matters of fact and law 
VII. Statement on Recording 
.I. The proceedings were recorded on a voice device only. There was no tape recording or 
~ r t  reporter, 
VIII. Issues on Appeal 
. I .  The following issues will be addressed on appeal: 
a. Does Visual Estimation of Speed meet the Daubert test? 
b. Does the State of Idaho have to have a criteria for visual estimation of speed? 
c. Did the court's failure to dismiss the allegations after the first time that the prosecutor 
failed to provide discovery violate public policy that infractions and the adjudication 
of these infractions be just, speedy and inexpensive. 
lated this lo* day of March 2008. 
/ ..., c.F " $.2#L!3 < 0 / y  , ,&.,7 i & 2, 
David M. Estes, Defendant 
lotice of Appeal - 2 David M. Estes 




P A W  9. WEEKS 
TKEhPl"" 
-."- -A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ I'ERCE 
1 Case No. Cr07-08507 




1 ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE 
VS. 1 





It is ORDERED that Judge Carl B. Kerrick, whose chambers are located in 
Lewiston, Idaho, is assigned to preside over all further proceedings in the above-entitled 
matter. 
P- DATED this Bday of March, 2008. 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Administrative District Judge 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE, - \, Ib 8 
CIRnCR A CCTc 'hTTKTC T T T n C E  - 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby cerfxfy that a full, true, complete 
and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE was mailed to: 
Erik Johnson- messenger 
David Estes 
1308 loth Ave 
Lewiston ID 83501 
Hon. Carl B. Kerrick 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE ,,, ., ji g 
DRnCR A C C T C W T X T C  TT TnCC - 3 
FILED 
@- 
PUTY . - 
IN TI* DISTRICT COURT OF TKE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 




1 CASE NO.CR07-08507 
1 
) ORDER DETERMINING 
) METHOD OF APPEAL 
) 
) 
Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rules Rule 54, the Court makes the following 
determination of method of appeal; 
1) This appeal involves questions of hct and questions orlaw; 
2) Said appeal should not be heard as a Trial de Novo; 
3) A transcript of the proceedings before the Magistrate's Division is required for the 
proceeding of this appeal; 
4) The appellant shall contact a court reporter and pay an estimate ofthe transcript 
costs within 14 days from the date of this Order; and 
ORDER DETERMINNG METHOD OF APPEAL 
UL, 26 
5) Upon payment of the estimated transcript fees, the transcriber shall prepare a 
transcript as provided in Rule 54. 
6) Upon lodging of the transcript, the Court shall determine the dates for filing of 
appellants and Respondents briefs and arguments. 
la- 
DATED this /8 day of March, 2008. 
/ 
0 
CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge 
CERTEICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER DETERMWPNG THOD OF APPEAL 
was mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this B a y  ofMarch, 2008, 
on: 
Erik Johnson 4.w 
Deputy Prosecutor 
P 0 Box 896 
Lewiston ID 83501 
David Estes 
1308 10" Ave 
Lewiston ID 83501 
ORDER DETERMINING 
METHOD O F  APPEAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL. DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 CASE NO. CR07-08507 
Plaintifmespondent, 1 
1 ORDER SCHEDULING BRDEFS 
VS. 1 AND ARGUMENT 
1 
DAVID M. ESTES, 1 
1 
DefendantIAppellant, 1 
Pursuant to this Court's order, a transcript of the proceedings in the Magistrates' 
Division has now been lodged with this Court. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1) DefendantIAppellant shall file his brief on or before May 15,2008; 
2) PlaintifflRespondent shall file their brief on or before June 12,2008; 
ORDER SCHEDULING B R I E F S  
AND ARGUMENT 
3) DefendanUAppellant shall file his reply brief by July 3,2008; 
4) Oral argument shall take place before the above-entitled Court in the Courtroom 
of the Nez Perce County Courthouse on July 22,2008, commencing at 11 :00 a.m.. 
DATED this *day of April, 2008. 
-. 
CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER SCHEDULING BRlEF WND ARGUMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this day of 
April, 2008, on: 
Erik Johnson 
Deputy Prosecutor 
P 0 Box 896 
Lewiston ID 83501 
David Estes 
1308 10" ~ v e  
Lewiston ID 83501 
ORDER SCHEDULING B R I E F S  
AND ARGUMENT 
IN THE NEZ PERCE COUNTY SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
County of NEZ PERCE ) Cause NO: CR-2007-0008507 
Plainti I Respondent, ) 
v, ) Motion to Augment Record on Appeal 
) 
David M. Estes, ) 
Defendant 1 Appellant 
l~omes  now the defendant, David M. Estes, and moves the court for an order to augment the 
/appellate record from the Magistrate Court to the District Coufi. 
This motion is based on the following: 
I. Facts 
1 .I. On March 10" 2008, the defendant filed an appeal from the magistrate division to the 
district court. As part of that appeal, the defendant moves the court to allow the record to be 
supplemented with certain pleadings in addition to the trial transcript. 
II. Argument 
2.1 The defendant is asking for the record to be augmented with three pleadings all of which 
are necessary to complete the defendant's appeal in this case. The three documents are a cou 
order allowing the plaintiff an extension of time, motion to dismiss which was denied by 
the court and an order continuing the case. These documents are needed to show that the 
court improperly continued the trial instead of dismissing the complaint. ( See exhibits I, ll and 
111.) 
Motion to Augment Record - 1 David M. Estes 
1308 1 om AV. 
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208.746.1744 
Sr ,?d Judicial District Court, State of  16-50 
.A  and For the County of Nez Perci 
i .  .> . . 1230 Main St. 
~,.,. !, . . Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
, . . . . . ' 
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VS. ) Case No: CR-2007-0008507 
1 
David M Estes, ) NOTICE OF HEARING 
Defendant. ) 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Court Trial Monday, March 03,2008 10:OO AM 
Judge: Jay P. Gaskill 
a t  the Nez Perce County Courthouse in  Lewiston, Idaho. 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and 
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Monday, 
December 31,2007. 
Defendant: David M Estes 
1308 10th Ave 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Mailed Hand Delivered- 
Private Counsel: 
Mailed- Hand Delivered- 
Prosecutor: Erik L. Johnson 
Mailed- Hand D e l i v e r e d 1  
Dated: Monday. December 31. 2007 
Patty 0. Weeks 
Clerk Of The District Court 
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Comes now the defendant, David M. Estes, and moves for a dismissal of the charges pending 
before the court in this cause. This motion is based on the following: 
I. Facts 
DEPUTY 
IN THE NEZ PERCE COUNTY SECOND !3$77!3?&!RT1 









/I .I On I lROROO7 the defendant submitted a request for production of documents. That I 
County of NEZ PERCE ) Cause NO: CR-2007-0008507 
Plaintiff 1 Respondent, 1 
v, ) Motion to Dismiss 
) 
David M. Estes, ) 
Defendant I Appellant 
request included a copy of the officers training records that show he was trained on the type of 
radar used, a copy of the FCC license issued to the State of Idaho to operate radar units, and a 
copy of the officer's log on the day of the alleged infraction. 
1.2. The plaintiff submitted a request for an extension of time to gather the material and was 
granted a fourteen day extension. To date the aforementioned documents were not produced. 
i II. Authority I 
12.1. This motion is brought pursuant to ICR 16 (e)(2). 
Dated this 31' day of December 2007 
Motion to dismiss - 1 
_~-ee~~p~-~;;r~fttttttttt 
David M. Estes, Defendant 
David M. Estes 
1308 1 ow AV. 
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208.746.1744 
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD 2 7 
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD 
I! !, 28 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DAVID M. ESTES, 
Respondent. 
CASE NO. CR2007-0008507 
ORDER ALLOWING ADDITIONAL TIME 
TO FILE DISCOVERY 
Based upon the State's Motion and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State is granted an additional fourteen (14) 
days to file supplemental discovery. 
DATED this J b%ay of December, 2007. 
JAY P. GWS#!L% 
JUDGE 
O ~ ! @ K I O N  TO AUGMENT RECORD -2 9 
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD 20 
Ill. Authority 
1. This motion is based on Criminal Rule 54.1 1 and Appellate Rule 30. 
IV. Relief Requested 
1. The court is asked to allow the defendsnt to augment the record on appeal. 
ated this 1 0 ~  day of April 2008. 
- ~-.p&zy-&d&EZL 
David M. Estes, Defendant 
lotion to Augment Record - 2 David M. Estes 
1308 1 om AV. 
LEWISTON, ID 
208.746.1744 
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD 
FILED 
I m MY 15 pfl 2 40 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE S 
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND 
STATE OF IDAHO I 
PLAINTIFF I RESPONDENT 
I 
C& 67-09 .507 
DAVID M. ESTES 
DEFENDLWT I APPELLANT 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal fkom the Magistrate Court of the Second Judicial Dislrict for Nez Perce County. 
Honorable Jay Gaskill, Magistrate Judge, presiding. 
David M. Estes, Appellant 
Pro Se 
1308 loth Av. 
Lewiston Idaho 83501 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Erik Johnson, 
Nez Perce County 
Prosecuting Attorney 
1109 "F" St. 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a trafic intiaction case on appeal from the Magistrate Division of the Second Judicial 
District in and for the County of Nez Perce. David M. Estes was cited on October 16& 2007 by 
State Trooper John Ferriss on Highway 95 outside Lewiston, Idaho, for speeding. Estes contested 
the charge and demanded a bench trial. 
The court assigned a trial date of November 20' 2007 which was changed due to an objection to 
a judge who would preside. Dnring this transitional period where no judge was assigned, and in 
response to a request for production of records by the defendant, David Estes, the Nez Perce 
County Prosecuting Attorney's Office submitted a request for an extension of time to comply 
with discovery. That motion was made on the 30' day of November by the Nez Perce County 
Prosecutors Office represented by DPA Erik Johnson. That motion was granted on 12 December 
2007 by the Honorable Jay Gaskill, Magistrate Judge for Nez Perce County. A trial date of 
December 3 I", 2007 at 10:OO A.M. was set. 
On December 31S', 2007, the defendant, David Estes, filed a motion to dismiss for failure to 
provide discovery. The motion to dismiss was denied by Judge Gaskilt. Judge Gaskill ordered 
that a new trial date of March 3'd 2008 be set and that all parties were to resolve all issues prior 
' to that date. 
On March 3'd 2008, a bench trial was held before the Honorable Jay P. Gaskill, Magistrate Judge 
for Nez Perce County. Immediately upon the opening testimony of the state's witness Trooper 
John Ferriss, it was discovered that the Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office had not supplied 
the defendant with the proper information related to the radar unit. At that point a proper 
objection was raised to the testimony pertaining to the radar unit. The court disallowed any 
testimony pertaining to the radar. Prosecutor Johnson then proceeded to trail without the use of 
any radar reading to support the testimony of Trooper Fenis. 
The trial was held on the basis of the trooper's visual estimation of the defendant's speed. 
Trooper Ferris testified that he was a twenty year veteran of the Idaho State Police. That he 
underwent certification by sitting in a police vehicle and observing vehicles and estimating their 
speed while an instructor kept a record of his estimations using a rsdar gun to verify his speed 
estimations. Trooper Fems testified that he did not have any specific scientific knowledge of 
visual estimation of speed nor had he personally studied the visual estimation of speed at any 
college or other institution. 
A judgment was rendered in favor of the State of Idaho. The defendant now appeals that 
judgment. At issue is whether the state can convict solely on the visual estimation of speed made 
by the citing officer and whether the court's failure to dismiss the complaint violated the public 
policy that adjudication of idhctions be just speedy and inexpensive. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the court err by finding for the state based solely on the officer's visual estimation of 
speed? 
2. Did the court err by failing to dismiss the allegations after the first time that the prosecutor 
failed to provide discovery and did that failure to dismiss violate public policy that adjudication 
of infractions be just, speedy and inexpensive? 




1 . 1 .  !Xp_Tm; COURT ERR BY FLNDlNG FOR_Tf-IE STm; BASED SOLE1,Y ON THE 
OFFICER'S VISUAI, ESTUIKrION 01; SPEED ? 
The State of Idaho in this case has proposed that the human eye can estimate speed s&cient to 
establish liability. In order for the state to meet its burden, it must show that the particular claim 
meets certain criteria That criteria can be defined as: 
a. whether the theory has been or can be tested for validity. 
b. whether the theory has been subjected to peer review or publication. 
c. what the known or potential rate of error is when the theory is applied. 
d. whether there are there are any maintenance of standank or whether standards exist. 
e. whether the theory is accepted in the scientific cornunity and to what degree. 
, 
These standards are found in the case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 
579 (1993). The U.S. Supreme Court went on to say that the courts should consider the known or 
potential rate of error of a theory, quoting Daubert in United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d. 348. 
The State of Idaho in two cases states that the Daubert standards are not used but rely on Rules 
of Evidence 702. That rules reads: 
" If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise." 
In two Idaho cases the Idaho Supreme Court stated the policy of the court. The cases were 
State v. Me&, 131 Idaho 642,962 P2d 1026 and Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 
143 Idaho 834. In Weeks the court stated, " The focus of the court's inquiry is on principles and 
methodology not on the conclusions they generate." The court in these two cases went on to say 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
that the foundation for admission of opinion testimony must be based upon scientific knowledge 
and includes both that the witness is an expert in the field and that there is a scientific basis for 
the experts opinion. Simply put, as in Prey-Daubert, the court is placed in the role of gatekeeper 
to ensure that the expert opinion is both relevant and reliable. 
Further the United States Supreme Court in Kumho T i e  Co. v. Cannichael, 526 U.S. 137, 
119 S.Ct 1 167, 1174-1 176 stated that the Daubert principals applied to both scier~tific and 
technical opinion. In the Kumho case, the court disallowed the expert opinion testimony based 
on the witness's methodology which is consistent with the Idaho approach in Weeks and 
Merwin. 
For a court to take judicial notice of a principal, the principal must be an accepted one in the 
appropriate scientific community. Decisions that simply declare a device or scientific 
methodology reliable without explanation is of little value. In State v. Williamson, 144 Idaho 
597, 166 p.31d. 387, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that to take judicial note of a particular 
theory or technical fact there must be a basis for the notice not just that someone else does it 
or we just do it that way. 
This brings us to the state's use of visual estimation of speed to determine the speed of a vehicle. 
the state must show that there is some scientific basis or provable basis for claiming that the 
visual estimation of speed technique is accurate and that the human eye can determine speed 
simply by observation. The state cannot establish that there is a scientific study or any research 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
that shows that the human eye can accurately determine speed. The appellant has asked the Idaho 
State Police Academy for any such study or research done on the visual estimation of speed. 
They have none. ( See exhibit I ) Visual estimation of speed cannot pass a Daubert, Frey, or 
Evidence Rule 702 standard. 
In State v. Garret, 119 Idaho 878, 81 1 P.2d. 488, the court made an interesting d i n g  that is 
germain to this case. Garret involved the use of an eye test call HGN to determine if a person 
was intoxicated. The court held that the test was useful in determining intoxication but standing 
alone the test was not sufficient to convict because it had no scientific evidence of reliability 
However the test in conjunction with other observations could be used to convict a person of 
intoxication. Here we find a similar situation. Visual Estimation of Speed has no scientific basis 
and is used to assist officers in determining which vehicle is speeding or to assist in verifying a 
radar reading. Absent a more accurate and scientific verifiable measure the visual estimation of 
speed alone is not sufficient to convict. It certainly does not meet the standard of beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
The visual estimation of speed depends upon a variety of factors, including distance, position, 
length of observation, existence of reference points and experience of the witness in judging 
speed. Trooper Ferriss in his testimony testified that the vehicle in question was 700 to 800 feet 
away when he first saw it. He estimated the speed to be at 65 m.p.h. ( TR 7) Trooper Ferris did 
not testify that he used any reference points. ( TR 17-18)When asked if the Trooper had any 
training in visual estimation of speed he stated that he had been trained in the academy ( TR 6-7) 
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and that he had been periodically tested through the years. ( TR 6-7) 
On cross examination, Trooper Femss stated that his recertification consisted of sitting in the 
back of a polide car with an instructor who used a radar to verify Trooper Ferriss' estimates. 
( TR 18) Trooper Ferriss testified that he had no secondary !mining such as a college or school 
that taught any theory of visual estimation of speed. ( TR 19 ) He could not have because none 
exist. 
Trooper Ferriss was placed in a police car in an area where the speed limit was known. Vehicles 
would have observed the speed l i t  generally. Since the speed limit was known it was very 
easy to guess the speed of a vehicle by comparing the speed of vehicles in the area A more 
accurate test would have been to take the trooper to an area where he did not know the speed 
limit and test him for accuracy. Another test would have been at night with no street lights or 
limited lighting. This was not done. The point is that the tests that the state relies on are highly 
inaccurate and do not meet the requirements for opinion testimony under Evidence Rule 702 et 
al. 
1.2. DID THE COURT ERR BY FAILING TO DISMISS THE ALLEGATIONS AFTER THE 
FIRST TIME THAT THE PROCESCUTOR FAKED TO PROVIDE DISCOVERY AND DID 
THAT FAILURE TO DISMISS VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY THAT THE ADJUDICATION 
OF HFRACTIONS BE JUST SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE ? 
Idaho has followed suit in decriminalizing traffic violations. Many states have changed the 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
classification of traffic violations to civil offenses. This is to not clog the courts up with jury 
trials or long drawn out contested proceedings when there are more pressing cases on the court 
docket. Many states such as Washington State have even adopted Infraction Rules for Courts of 
Limited Jurisdiction. 
Idaho's policy on t r a ~ c  infractions is stated quite well in a controlling case titled, State of Idaho 
v. Bennion, 112 Idaho 32,730 P.2d.952. Bennion addressed the issues of whether the legislature 
had made traffic infractions civil violations and whether a jury trial was required. The court in its 
ruling on those issues stated in part: 
"The legislature gave a number of indications that its intent was to impose a 
non-criminal non-punitive sanction. Its labeling of hfhctions as "civil, " though 
ineffective in light of Article 5, Section 1, is one indicator. A second is found in 
the legislative statement of putpose of the ITIA, which articulated the intent, "to 
remove jail sentences and jury trials &om all of the non-serious motor vehicle 
offenses." Statement of Purpose, R.S. 7129, H.B. 343 (1981). A third is reflected 
in the fact that if Bennion refuses to pay the fine, he will only be subject to having 
his license suspended. I.C. section 49-3408. " Such a suspension is not punitive 
but acts as a coercive measure in the nature of a civil sanction." Anton, Supra, 463 
A.2d at 707. The Idaho legislature obviously did not view traac infr-actions as 
worthy of stigma or condemnation. 
Basically the legislature wanted to keep it simple, reduce the cost of litigation and not clog up the 
courts with minor traffic infractions. This policy of keeping it simple is found in Washington 
State's Infraction Rules for Court of Limited Jurisdiction. ( IRW) Its rule 1.1 (b) reads: 
" Purpose - These rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every h h c t i o n  case." 
The Washington State Appellate Court in City of Kirkland, v. Ellis, 82 Wa. App. 819, 
920 P.2d. 206 (1996) re-enforced that policy. A Washington State citizen like the present 
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appellant was forced to go to the court house three times to defend against the MIC citation. 
The court held that requiring a citizen to repeatedly go to the courthouse to defend himself 
violated Rule 1.1. (b). 
In this case, the court granted an extension to the state. ( Motion Requesting Additional T i e  
to File Discovery dated November 3 0 ~  2007 ) Even after the motion to extend time was granted, 
the state failed to comply with discovery resulting in a defendant's motion to dismiss ( Motion 
to Dismiss dated December 3 ld 2007) The court denied the motion and set a new court date. 
Finally after a second appearance by the defendant to defend against the ticket, it was discovered 
again that the prosecution had failed to comply with discovery. ( TR 8-10) 
It is implied in the legislative action that decriminalizing traffic offenses and declaring them civil 
infractions is to ensure a speedy, just and inexpensive adjudication of W c  violations. This 
claim is reinforced by the actions of the Idaho Supreme Court which drafted the law in the fust 
place and gave it to the judicial committee for processing. ( See Justice Bistline's comments in 
Bennion ) The courts needed some way to stop the log jam in the court system and viewed the 
Traffic Infractions Act as a way of relieving that workload. 
1.3. IS THE APPELLANT ENTITLED TO REASONABLE EXPENSES ? 
The appellant has incurred expenses in preparing this brief such as printing costs and fees to 
prepare the trial transcript. The appellant should be allowed reasonable fees if he prevails. 
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11. CONCLUSION 
2.1. Qe State of ldaho has allowed a theory into its jurisprudence which has no scientific basis 
for its claims. The issue is the visual estimation of speed. There are no specific studies that 
address the issue of the visual estimation of speed by police officers. Questions such as does the 
officer use a stop watch to measure speed? Does the officer use points of reference to determine 
speed? Does the officer use the speed of other vehicles relative to the offenders speed to 
determine speed? Can a police officer determine speed at night when the vehicle is coming 
directly at the officer with headlights on? None of these questions have been tested in the 
scientific community. The visual estimation of speed fails the Frey Daubert test and the 
standad of review set by the Idaho Supreme Court under Evidence Rule 702. For any court 
to aczcpt the visual estimation of speed as the sole basis for finding for the state would mean that 
any police officer could stand on the side of the road and observe any vehicle for speeding. That 
officer could then charge the alleged offender based solely on his visual estimation of speed. 
That is hardly a legitimate standard the courts would want to allow and certainly should not. 
The visual estimation of speed is a tool to verify a speed measuring device not the main method 
used to determine speed especially when there are more accurate and reliable ways to measure 
speed. 
2.2. In decriminalizing certain traffic offenses, the State of Idaho with the cooperation of its 
Supreme Court established a system to adjudicate nteaffjc violations fairly, quickly and 
inexpensively. It is not fair to require a citizen to repeatedly have to come to the Court House 
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to defend against a traffic violation that is civil in nature. This defeats the purpose of making 
traffic infraction civil in nature in order to conserve limited judicial resources. If the state fails to 
observe court procedures established through the court rules then the court should dismiss the 
charge. A citizen should not be penalized for the mistakes of the state prosecution by being 
required to appear repeatedly at the court house. 
The court should reverse the lower court's admission of testimony on the visual estimation of 
speed and dismiss the judgment. 
The court should dismiss the judgment because the prosecution failed to abide by the rules of 
discovery and it puts an unfair burden on the appellant to continually appear to defend himself 
through no fault of his own. 
Dated this 14" Day of May 2008. 
----- q'-~29--/1"1~21E&z: 




Idaho State Po 
Service since 1939 
Colonet G. Jerry Russell 
Director 
C.L. "Butch" Otter 
Governor 
April 28, 2008 
David Estes 
1308 10"' Avenue 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
RE: PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST 
Dear Mr. Estes: 
The Idaho State Police has received your request dated April 16,2008, for information under 
Idaho's Public Writings Act. 
REQUEST: ' Regarding officer training information. Request cc of any training criteria for 
officers in visual estimation of speed; scientific research to support state's assertion that an 
officer can visually estimate the speed of a vehicle; any research done to support training of 
officers on visual estimation of speed; any rules that require an officer to certify on use of speed 
ineasuring devices. 
RESPONSE: After consultation with the attorney for the Idaho State Police, your request is 
partially denied as this is a record that Idaho State Police does not compile or maintain the 
information requested, pursuant to IDAHO CODE 3 9-337(13). 
You have a right to appeal this denial of your request by filing a petition in conformance with the 
pl.ovisions of the Idaho Public Writings Act, Idaho Code 5 9-343. Your petition must be filed in 
the Fourth Judicial District Couit of Idaho within one hundred eighty (180) calendar days of the 
mailing of this response. 
Sincerely, 







an, Idaho 83680-0700 (208)884-7000 .Fax (208)884-7090 
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECON 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
:ounty of NEZ PERCE ) Cause NO: CR-2007-0008507 
Plaintiff I Respondent, 1 
v, ) Motion to Stay Judgment 
1 
lavid M. Estes, 1 
;omes now the defendant, David M. Estes, and moves the court for an order to Stay the 
udgment in this case. 
'his motion is based on the following: 
I. Facts 
.I. On March 10" 2008, the defendant filed an appeal from the magistrate division to the 
listrict court. There has been a hearing date set for June of 2008 for oral argument. The 
~rief of the appellant has been filed and sewed, 
1.2. A payment schedule was signed giving the appellant until 3 April 2008 to pay the 
udgment. The appellant appealed the decision but in reading the transcript it appears the 
:ourt wants a separate motion to stay the judgment. That is the purpose of this motion. 
11. Argument 
!.I The appellant has appealed the judgment in this case. In all likelihood he will prevail at the 
3ppeals level. It makes no sense to impose judgment then have to return any monies paid to 
:he court. 
blotion to Stay Judgment - 1 David M. Estes 




1. This motion is based on Criminal Rule 54.5. 
IV. Relief Requested 
1. The court is asked to stay the judgment in this case pending the outcome of an appeal. 
3ted this 15" day of May 2008. 
/ ---&c-~-M-<-&LK~~: 
David M. Estes, Defendant 
lotion to Stay Judgment -2 David M. Estes 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, LN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DAVID M. ESTES, 
Defendant. 
) 
1 CASE NO. CR07-08507 
1 




Defendant/Appellant filed his Motion to Stay Judgment on May 16,2008. The Court 
have reviewed and considered the motion hereby GRANTS Defendant/Appellantlt's Motion to Stay 
Judgment. 
Dated this &day of May, 2008. 
s. 
CARL B. KERRICK-District Judge 
ORDER FOR STAY 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILWG 
I hereby certify that a true copy of 
the foregoing ORDER FOR STAY was mailed, 
postage prepaid, by the un ersigned at 
May, 2008, to: 
A ' Lewiston, Idaho, this 26day of 
Erik Johnson -me~\~lw J 
P O Box 1267 
Lewiston ID 83501 
David M. Estes 
1308 1 0 ~ ~ v e  
Lewiston ID 83501 
PATTY 0 .  WEEKS, Clerk 
ORDER FOR STAY 
DANIEL L. SPICKLER 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting 
Erik L. Johnson 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 799-3073 
I.S.B.N. 5995 
I N  THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, I N  AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, CASE NO. CR2007-0008507 
VS. 
DAVID M. ESTES, 
PLAINTIFF'S / RESPONDENT'S 
APPELLATE BRIEF 
Defendant/Appellant. 
COMES NOW, Erik L. Johnson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Nez Perce 
County, State of Idaho, and submits the State's brief in response to  Appellant David ~ 
Estes' appeal. ~ 
FACTS ~ 
On October 16, 2007 Trooper John Ferriss of the Idaho State Police issued ~ 
David Estes an infraction citation for speeding in Nez Perce County, Idaho. On ~ 
October 25, 2007, Estes entered a plea of not guilty. On November 20, 2007, a ~ 
pretrial hearing was held. The matter was set for a court trial on December 17, ~ 
2007. On November 29, 2007, Estes filed a motion to disqualify the presiding 1 
State v. Estes 1 
Plaintiff's / Respondent's Appellate Brief 51 
judge without cause. A new judge was assigned and the trial was reset for 
December 31, 2007. 
On December 31, 2007, a hearing was held. The trial was continued to 
March 3, 2008, due to  discovery issues. The trial was held on March 3, 2008. 
Estes had previously filed a timely Request for Production of Documents requesting 
certain information from the State. One request was for the "model, make, brand 
name and serial number of the radar unit used in this case." The State disclosed 
information relating to  a Doppler speed radar detector. I t  was revealed at trial that 
the officer had used a LIDAR speed detector. The State had provided discovery 
unrelated to the speed detector used by the officer. Based on this, Estes made a 
motion to dismiss the citation. However, the trial continued without the testimony 
of  the radar speed. The Court found Estes guilty based on the officer's testimony of 
his visual estimation of the vehicle's speed. 
I1 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Estes filed his Notice of Appeal on March 10, 2008, raising three issues: 
1. Does visual estimation of speed meet the Daubert test? 
2. Does the State of Idaho have to have criteria for visual estimation of 
speed? 
3. Did the court's failure to dismiss the allegations after the first time that 
the prosecutor failed to provide discovery violate public policy that 
infractions and the adjudication of these infractions be just, speedy and 
inexpensive? 
I n  his Appellate Brief Estes raised a fourth issue: 
4. I s  the Appellant entitled to reasonable expenses? 
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ARGUMENT 
1. Does visual estimation of speed meet the Daubert test? 
Estes asserts that the trial court should not have admitted the opinion 
testimony of the officer regarding vehicle speed. Before addressing the merits of 
the question posed, the State first contends that this Court should decline the 
invitation to address this issue because Estes did not object to this testimony at 
trial, and any error in the admission of this testimony was not fundamental error. 
By failing to object to this testimony, Estes did not preserve his right to raise this 
issue for the first time on appeal. State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 822 (1998); 
State V. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 423 (1989). 
I f  this Court does address the merits, the State argues that the admission of 
the officer's opinion testimony was proper. I n  Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court set forth rules governing expert testimony to 
the admission of scientific evidence at trial. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). However, Idaho 
courts have not adopted the Daubert standard for admissibility of evidence. 
Swallow v. Emergency Med. Of  Idaho, 138 Idaho 589, 595 n. 1 (2003). Rather, 
Idaho courts use Rule 702 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence to determine admissibility 
of expert testimony. 
Rule 702 provides: 
I f  scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to  understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, 
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
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The trial court's broad discretion in admitting evidence will only be disturbed on 
appeal when there has been a clear abuse of  discretion. State v. Menuin, 131 
Idaho 642, 646 (1998). 
The trial transcript shows that Trooper Ferriss testified regarding his visual 
estimation of  Estes' speed. Trooper Ferriss testified that he was stationary on U.S. 
Highway 95 on the Lewiston Hill. Tr. 5. Trooper Ferriss was standing outside of  his 
patrol car when he saw Estes' vehicle traveling southbound. Tr. 6. He estimated 
the vehicle's speed to be 65 miles per hour in a posted 55 mile per hour speed 
zone. Tr. 7. Trooper Ferriss testified that Estes'vehicle was traveling alone and 
that he had a clear, unobstructed view of  the vehicle. Tr. 21. 
Trooper Ferriss also testified regarding his training and experience in 
estimating a vehicle's speed. When he was attending the basic POST Academy and 
the State Police Academy in 1988 he was trained to estimate a vehicle's speed 
while in a traveling mode and while stationary. Tr. 6. Trooper Ferriss is required to 
maintain his proficiency in speed estimation in order to requalify for his speed radar 
certification. Tr. 6, 18. The standard of accuracy that must be achieved to be 
certified in speed estimation is plus or minus five miles per hour of the actual speed 
of the vehicle. Tr. 7. Trooper Ferriss testified that he can estimate a vehicle's 
speed from 700-800 feet away. Tr. 14. Trooper Ferriss also testified that his 
training is essentially ongoing, as he uses speed estimation skills in his everyday 
patrol duties. Tr. 7. 
Applying Trooper Ferriss' testimony to I.R.E. 702, he testified regarding his 
knowledge, skill, experience, and training in the visual estimation of  a vehicle's 
speed. Starting with his basic training in 1988, Trooper Ferriss has approximately 
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20 years of training, re-certifications, and on-duty application of this skill. Trooper 
Ferriss qualifies as an expert in the visual estimation of a vehicle's speed under the 
standards set forth in I.R.E. 702. 
Even though Trooper Ferriss has advanced training in estimating a vehicle's 
speed, the State argues that a person without such advanced training can also 
testify regarding an estimate a vehicle's speed. I n  Werth v. Tromberg, the court 
allowed a citizen witness to  testify about his visual estimation of a vehicle's speed. 
90 Idaho 204, 208 (1965). Before allowing such testimony, the court required a 
foundation as to the witness' knowledge of the area, familiarity with speed and 
specifically, of the speed of the type of vehicle he observed, prior observations of 
the speed of such vehicles and his checking of such speed with his own 
speedometer while he was driving. Id. The witness then estimated the vehicle's 
speed at about 70 miles per hour. Id. 
The court opined that "[ilt has been held almost without exception in this 
country that a person of reasonable intelligence and ordinary experience who has 
had sufficient opportunity to view the speed of a moving object may state his 
opinion of such speed." Id. (citing 32 C.J.S. Evidence 5 546(53) and (54)). I n  
another case, the Idaho Court of Appeals allowed testimony of a lay witness as to a 
vehicle's speed. Smith v. Praegitzer, 113 Idaho 887, 891 (Ct. App. 1988). The 
Court stated that "[s]uch evidence may be accepted as probative, competent 
evidence; the weight to be given it rests with the trier of fact." Id. 
The magistrate court found Estes guilty of speeding based on the officer's 
visual observation. The officer estimated Estes' speed at 65 miles per hour in a 
posted 55 mile per hour zone. To be certified Trooper Ferriss can be off a 
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maximum of five miles per hour over or under the actual speed of the vehicle. 
Even if Trooper Ferriss' estimate was off by five miles per hour in Estes' favor, his 
vehicle would still have been traveling over the posted speed limit. The precise 
amount by which a speed limit is exceeded is not an essential element of the 
offense of speeding; it is only necessary that the evidence show that the limit was 
exceeded. See I.C. 5 49-654. 
Estes did not preserve this issue for appeal by timely objecting to the 
testimony a t  trial. Further, it is the State's position that Trooper Ferriss meets the 
requirements to testify as an expert in the visual estimation of speed based upon 
his knowledge, skill, experience, and training. Based on Idaho case law, Trooper 
Ferriss could also testify to the same as a lay witness pursuant to I.R.E. 701. 
2. Does the State of Idaho have to have criteria for visual estimation 
of speed? 
This issue was raised in Estes' Notice of Appeal but not specifically addressed 
in his Appellant Brief. Estes has not cited and the State is not aware of any 
statutory or case law requiring criteria for the visual estimation of speed. To the 
extent that this issue relates to opinion testimony please refer to section 1 above. 
3. Did the court's failure to dismiss the allegations after the first 
time that the prosecutor failed to provide discovery violate public 
policy that infractions and the adjudication of these infraction be 
just, speedy and inexpensive? 
The current incarnation of the Idaho Infraction Rules took effect on July 1, 
1983. The infraction rules contain no reference to a time frame in which a trial 
must be held. Idaho Code section 19-3501 mandates that criminal defendants 
must be brought to trial within certain time frames. However, section 19-3501 
does not apply to infractions. State v. Burtlow, 144 Idaho 455, (Ct. App. 2007). 
State v. Estes 6 
Plaintiff's / Respondent's Appellate Brief ,~-. 
Estes has not cited any statutory or case law, and the State is not aware of any, 
that would have required the magistrate court to dismiss the charge. The 
magistrate court did not err in denying Estes' motion to dismiss. 
4. I s  the Appellant Entitled to Reasonable Expenses? 
Estes raises the issue of his expenses for the first time in his Appellate brief. 
As in sections 2 and 3 above, Estes has not cited any law, and the state is not 
aware of any, to  allow the court to award expenses in an infraction case. The State 
requests this Court deny the request for expenses. 
v 
CONCLUSION 
Estes did not object to testimony regarding visual estimation of speed and 
therefore did not preserve the issue for appeal. However, if the Court does address 
this issue, the testimony was properly admitted under both I.R.E. 701 and 702. 
Estes has not provided any statutory or case law showing that the State of Idaho is 
required to have criteria for the visual estimation of speed, justifying a dismissal of 
his case, or entitling him to fees. The State requests that this Court affirm the 
decision of the magistrate court. 
Respectfully submitted this & day of lune, 2008. 
Deputy rosecuting Attorney B 
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1. ARGUMENT 
1 .l. DID THE APPELLANT LOSE HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL BECAUSE HE DID NOT 
RAtSE A TIMELY OBJECTION ? 
The state in its brief at page 3 avers that the appellant did not raise a timely objection to the 
visual estimation of speed testimony of the state's witness. The record does not support such a 
claim. The record at page 10 shows that the appellant objected and asked that the cause be 
dismissed. The state plainly stated it was going to proceed on the basis of visual estimation of 
speed. The court then ruled that the state could proceed. Any M e r  objection would have been 
moot. ( TR 10 ) The court had ruled on the issue. 
At the end of the testimony, the court asked the appellant if he had any witnesses or wished to 
testify. When the appellant stated he did not, the court simply ruled that the state had met its 
burden of proof and found for the state. The court did not allow any closing arguments or give 
the appellant the chance to object to the courl's prior ruling. ( TR 21 and 22 ) 
1.2. DID THE COURT ALLOW THE STATE TO PROCEED TO TRIAL WITHOUT A 
LEGAL BASIS ? 
As averred in the appellant's original brief there is no scientific evidence to support visual 
estimation of speed. An exchange with the Idaho State Police Academy and the Attorney 
General's Office is even more t e l I i .  
$.' 
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After the hearing, the appellant began a series of public records requests with the Idaho P.O.S.T. 
Academy and the Idaho State Police Academy on the subject of visual estimation of speed. On 
April 16", 2008, the appellant sent a public records request to the Idaho State Police. In response 
to the request a, K.Am Cronin, Special Assistant wrote that the I.S.P. did not maintain or 
compile records on the visual estimation of speed. ( Attachment I ) In response to the letter, the 
appellant again wrote to Ms. Cronin demanding fiirther clarification of her letter of 28 April 
since it called into question the testimony of Trooper Femss in this case. ( Attachment II ) 
My letter of 20 May was referred to an Assistant Attorney General named Jenny Grunke. Ms. 
Grunke's letter confirmed the information given to me by Ms. Cronin was accurate. In her letter 
Ms. Grunke advised that the I.S.P. did not have a separate and distinct method of speed 
measurement entitled visual estimation of speed nor did the I.S.P. provide a certification 
specific to such a method. ( Attachment 111 ) That letter section directly contxadicted Trooper 
Ferriss' statement under oath. ( TR 6 and 7) Trooper Femss testified that he was certified on 
visual estimation of speed. 
Based on the Grunke letter of 22 May 2008, a f o r d  complaint was made to the Idaho State 
Police Office of Internal Investigations asking that Trooper Ferriss be investigated for perjury 
while testifying under oath. ( Attachment IV ) 
The I.S.P. through a Captain Kevin Hudgens responded to the complaint. Captain Hudgens 
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advised that the I.S.P. does not certify on the visual estimation of speed. Capt. Hudgens did say 
that the visual estimation of speed is included in the overall instruction on speed detection. 
( Attachment V ) What the averments by the Idaho State Police Show is that there is no 
certification of visual estimation of speed nor do they know of any scientific evidence 
pertaking to the visual estimation of speed. The Trooper's own testimony shows that the 
visual estimation of speed is questionable. When asked what his accuracy rate was in estimating 
speed, the trooper testified he did not recollect. ( TR 18 ) Yet the trooper testified he was 
required to estimate six moving and six stationary ( TR 18) ( Meaning six vehicles while the 
trooper was moving and six while in a stationary position. ) If he did not achieve the desired 
standard he would not re-qualify on the radar. The trooper should certainly have know his 
accuracy if his job depended on it. 
The point is that the court has allowed a conviction when there is no legal basis for the ruling. 
There is no legal standards that can be applied to the visual estimation of speed. That is why 
radar was invented. After years of court acceptance of radar and a need for such devices the 
courts cannot allow that technology to be discarded in favor of a standard that has no scientific 
basis and there is no consensus on how it is applied or taught. 
1.3. DID THE COURT ERR BY ALLOWING A WITNESS TO BE DECLARED AN EXPERT 
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The state is .trying to declare that Trooper Ferriss is an expert in visual estimation of speed. First 
the state proceeded on a theory that the radar used was accurate gave the true speed of the 
appellant's vehicle. When that radar reading was disallowed, the state changed its theory and 
proceeded on the theory of visual estimation of speed. ( TR 10 ) The appellant had come 
prepared to defend his position on the basis of a Doppler radar. The state blindsided him by 
giving him information on a Doppler radar. When the testimony began, it was discovered that 
the radar used was a laser radar not a Doppler. (This was the second time the state had failed to 
provide discovery.) The state then decided to use its only witness, Trooper Ferriss, as an expert 
witness on visual estimation of speed Again the appellant was blindsided by the state. The 
appellant was not informed that the trooper was an expert witness nor was any of his 
qualifications as an expert witness made available to the appellant 
Next the state changed its legal theory to visual estimation of speed without notice to the 
appellant that it intended to introduce such evidence. The appellant was again caught 
unawares of the evidence to be presented. The rules of discovery are designed to allow 
a liberal discovery process, the purpose of which are to provide parties with 
information essential to litigation of the issues, to e l i i a t e  surprise and to promote 
setttement. ( 23 Am.Jur.2d, Depositions and Discovery section 1, quoting Brown v. Katz, 868 
N.E. 2d 1159 (hd. Ct. of App. 2007) ) 
II. CONCLUSION 
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2.1. The record shows that the appellant did in fact ask for a dismissal of the charges at the time 
that the state declared its intent to proceed on a legal theory of visual estimation of speed. 
The appellant asked for a dismissal and the court ruled on the issue of the visual estimation of 
speed. That d i g  changed the entire theory on which this case was prosecuted. No notice was 
given to the appellant that the state intended to use its only witness as an expert. In the end the 
court allowed the state to present its case while the appellant was at a great disadvantage. 
The court has allowed a conviction on the basis of a theory that has no scientific basis and the 
appointing authority has no# consensus on its reliability and application. The trooper testified that 
he was certified on visual estimation of speed. The Idaho State Police and the Attorney General 
stated that no such certification existed. If you believe them then their trooper has committed 
perjury. The point is that visual estimation of speed standing by itself should not be used as the 
basis for convicting a person of speeding. 
Dated this 2 1 ~  Day of July 2008. 
-------- p!-~~g--&-:A~~-&z: --.. ----------- 
David M. Estes, Appellant Pro Se 
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Idaho State Police 
Service since 1939 
CL "Butch" Oner 
Govempr. 
I April 28,2008 
I David Estes 
1308 loLh Avenue 
I Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
I RE: PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST 
Dear Mr. Estes: 
I The Idaho State Police has received your request dated April 16,2008, for information under 
Idaho's Public Writings Act. 
I REQUEST: Regarding officer training information. Request cc of any training criteria for 
officers in visual estimation of speed; scientific research to support state's assertion that an 
II officer can visually estimate the speed of a vehicle; any research done to support training of officers on visual estimation of speed; any rules that require an officer to certify on use of speed 
I 
measuring devices. 
&81 RESPONSE: After consultation with the attorney for the Idaho State Police, your request is 
I 
partially denied as this is a record that ldaho State Police does not compile or maintain the 
information requested, pursuant to IDAHO CODE 5 9-337(13). 
I 
You have a right to appeal this denial of your request by filing a petition in conformance with the 
piovisions of the ldaho Public Writings Act, Idaho Code 5 9-343. Your petition must be filed in 
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Idaho within one hundred eighty (180) calendar days of the 
mailing of this response. 
Sincerely, 
II K. knn Cronin Special Assistant 
. 83680-0700 * (208)884-7000 *Fax (208)884-7090 
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May 20,2008 
K Ann Cronin 
Special & i t  
Idaho State Police 
P.0. BOX 700 
Meridian, Idaho 83680 
Sent with this letter is a copy of your letter dated the 28th of April 2008. AS I read the 
letter, more questions are raised than answered. 
When you sent the speed measuring device information you did not cite to any 
training manual or department policy. I cannot tell where the material is located in 
your system in the event that I would have to h u e  a subpoena for the information at 
a future date. 
You state in response to my request for information on the visual estimation of speed 
that you do notmmpile o r - d t a i n  information on that subject. Your letter do& not 
state what o r g e t i o n  or individual that does maintain such information. 
According to your troopers you do teach visual &hation of speed and do cemfy 
your t roope~  in the visual estimation of speed. I f you are saying that you don't then 
one of your troopers has committed perjury and I would subpoena you and the State 
Academy head to testif;f to that fad. I doubt that is the case however. 
My position is this. You have at least one instructor who teaches the visual estimation 
of speed class. That instructor has a lesson plan from which he / she teaches. I want a 
copy of that lesson plan. I do not want someone to explain the class to me. I want 
copies of the lesson plan. If you or the academy instructo~ do not maintain a lesson 
plan or policy on visual estimation of speed please state so. 
Thank you for your attention in this matter* 
Sincerely, 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
May 22,2008 
David M. Estes 
1308 1 o ' ~  Avenue 
I Liwiston, Idaho 83501 
RE: PUB1,lC RECORDS REQUEST 
I 
Dear Mr. Estes: 
Your letter dated May 20,2008, to Ms. Cronin, Special Assistant, Idaho State Police, has been 
forwarded to me for response. The record that you were sent was from the Idaho State Police 
I Employee Manual and is ldaho State Police Procedure number 07.15. That is the cite for where the record is located. 
I liave confirmed that the Idaho State Police does not compile or maintain information on the 1 visual estimation of speed. The ldaho State Police does not have a separate and distinct method 
of speed measurement entitled "Visual Estimation of Speed", nor does it provide a certification 
specific to such a method. The Idaho State Police does not have a separate course of training or 1 a lesson plan for visual estimation of speed. Visual estimation is simply a general description of 
the means any individual would first use to make a determination about an occurrence or 
process: use of one or more of the senses to invite further assessment about whether an anomaly I of some kind exists. 
If, for example, a trooper driving his patroI vehicle at a speed of 55 miles per hour notes a 
vehicle traveling in the same direction that is pulling away from him, he uses his sense of sight to 
I 
make that initial determination. This is simple visual estimation that is then confirmed by one of 
the methods we do teach, e.g. radar, lidar, or stopwatch. 
If you have any questions, please contact me at (208) 884-7050. 
sincerely, I 
Jenny C. Grunke 
Deputy Attorney General 
[Idaho State Police 
cc: Ann Cronin 
7 1 
M@&&&NT'S REPLY BRIgF nminaf l a w  Division. Idaho State Poiice 
P.O. Box 700. Meridian. ldaho 83680-0700 
Telephone: (208) 884-7050. FAX: (208) 884-7090 
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1308 loth AV 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
208.746.1744 
May 29,2008 
Lt. Col. Kevin Johnson 
Idaho State Police 
PO Box 700 
Meridian, Idaho 83680-700 
Dear Sir: 
I am currently involved in a dispute with your agency over a traflic incident The case 
number for that incident is Nez Pem County CRo7-08507. At the hearing, I was 
s u m f u l  in getting the radar reading excluded. However the court decided to 
convict on the trooper's visual estimation of speed I appealed that ruling and am 
waiting for the County to respond to my brief. I intend on asking the court to not hear 
the appeal but send it direct to the state supreme court because of the issues involved. 
While doing research on the issue in question, referred to as the visual estimation of 
speed, I sent a couple of public mrds requests to your agency. Eventually I got the 
letter that is sent with this missive from the Attorney General's office attached to your 
WWcy. 
The problem is this. The Attorney General's office states that your agency does not 
certify officers on the visual estimation of speed nor does it have any lesson plan or 
course of W i n g  on visual estimation of speed. Your hoper, a John F e d ,  
testified in court that he had to be certified on radar and had to pass a test on visual 
estimation of speed or he would not be certified on the use of radar. Trmper Ferriss' 
testimony was used to find me guilty of speeding. When you read this letter, it 
contradicts the trooper's testimony and in effect denies that the Idaho State Police 
teaches visual estimation of speed That means that either the Attorney General is 
mistaken or your trooper committed perjury. That is why I am writing to you 
In addition to the court hearing I encountered Trooper Feniss after the hearing in 
Lewiston Idaho. It was towards the end of April 2008. I was sitting in a left turn only 
Iane with a signal that has a green arrow and is separated fmm the other signal lights. 
Trooper Ferriss was sitting in fmnt of me. Trooper Ferris got out of his car and came 
back to my truck He asked me if my signals were working and why I did not: have my 
left signal on. I turned the signal on. Trooper F e k  then stated, " I guess that you 
have to turn it on to make it work" He then returned to his vehicle. By then the light 
had cycled though a p e n  arrow and back to a red arrow. 
I know of no reason for the trooper to act the way he did I know of no law that 
requires you to turn on your signal when you are in a turn only Iane with a separate 
signal light and the light had not turned green. I can only assume the trooper was not 
happy that I had embarrassed him at the trial and he wanted to needle me to let me 
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know that he had not forgotten. I would not have complained about the incident had 
P 1 not received the letter I did. a, Considering what has transpired I feel that an adrrrrmshil. . . tive investigation is 
warranted to determine what the facts are. My position is that in light of the letter 
E £rom the Attorney General your trooper has committed pejury and I intend on 
bringing .this to the attention of the court at some point In the meantime, I am 
I 
making a formal request to your office to investjgate this matter. I do not want to 
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- 
Colonel G. ] e m  Russell 
Idaho State Police 
Service since 1939 
C.L. % u W  otter 
Governs 
June 1 1,2008 
- 
David M. Estes 
I 1308 1 O'h Avenue Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
I RE: DISPUTED TRAFFIC INCIDENT 
Dear Mr. Estes: 
II Your letter dated May 29,2008, to Lt. Col. Keyin Johnson, Idaho State Police, has beekfomarded to me f ~ r  response.. The question you pose, is : 
whether the 1daho.State Police certifies officers on t~e'visualestimation-of 
1 speed. . . .  . .  . . . 
' .  . 
II The short answer to your question is no, the Idaho State Police does not conduct a separate course of instruction or certification 011 the visual 
estimation of speed. However, the Idaho State Police does certify troopers a in Speed Detection, and during this course of instruction the visual estimation of speed is included in this instruction. 
1 The current course of instruction for becoming certified in Speed Detection 
includes twenty-four hours of classroom and practical exercises to include 
I the visual estimation of speed. Each student, as part of practical exercises, while riding with a certified instructor must conduct 10 moving and 10 
II 
stationary visual estimations of speed and be within 5 miles per hours of the 
instructors radar reading. This test must be passed with 100% accuracy. 
Upon completing the classroon~ and practical portion of instruction the 
I] student must then complete an additional 40 hours of practical exercise training in speed detection conducted while on duty. During this training 
I students visually estimate the speed of vehicles and then check that speed with radar. Again, the student's visual estimation must be within 5 miles per 
hour of the radar reading to be valid. During this time, no enforcement 
I action can be taken relating to speed obtained by radar while the student is 
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completing this 40-hour block. Once all training is complete, the student 
becomes certified in Speed Detection. This training follows the guidelines 
set forth by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 
In reference to your question relating to a law requiring one to signal when : 
in a turn only lane with a separate signal light. I believe Idaho Code 49-808 
covers your question. Sub section one states: 
"No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle 
right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exitfrom a'highway unless 
and until the movement can be made with reasonable safe@ nor without 
giving an appropriate signal" 
The definition of a "Highway" is contained in Idaho Code 49-109, 
Definitions, section 11, subsectibn 5. 
"Highway" means the entire width between the boundary lines of 
every way publicly maintained when anypart is open to the use of thepublic 
for vehicular travel, with jurisdiction extending to the adjacent property 
line, including sidewalks, shoulders, berms and rights-of-way not intended 
for motorized traffic. The term "street " is interchangeable with highway. ,I  
If you have additional questions please contact me at (208) 884-7202. 
Sincerely, 
Idaho State Police 
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State of ldaho ) Cause NO: CR-2007-0008507 
Plaintiff I Respondent, ) 
v, ) Motion to Certify Appeal to Idaho 
) State Supreme Court 
David M. Estes, ) 
Defendant I Appellant 1 
/comes now the defendant, David M. Estes, and moves the court for an order to certify this 
/case from the District Court to the ldaho State Supreme Court. 
This motion is based on the following: 
231 1 I. Facts I 
25 1 .I. On March 10" 2008, the defendant filed an appeal from the Magistrate Division to the 2 4 ~  I 
1 IDisfrict court The parties briefs are complete and the case awaits a hearing date. 1 
1.2. The main issue in this case is whether a police officer's visual estimation of speed can be 
30 







1 Irequires that the State Supreme Court needs to give guidance on. if this case was left to stand, I 
40 
the sole basis for determining whether an accused should be tried and found guilty of violating 
speed laws 
II. Argument 
41 then it would make the use of speed detection devices obsolete and unnecessary. A police 
42 ' 1  I I 
43 officer would merely have to stand on the side of the road and observe traffic. He could cite 
44 I I 
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3.1. This motion is based on R.A.P. 12.1 ( c ) (I). 
IV. Relief Requested 
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For decades, law enforcement has relied on s that a motorist 
was in violation of speed statutes. Why h 
devices with an officers observations. 






4.1. The court is asked to enter an order recommending permission to appeal directly to the 
Idaho State Supreme Court. 
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David M. Estes 
1308 1 ow AV. 
LEWISTON, ID 
208.746.1744 
Motion to Certify to Supreme Court - 2 
DANIEL L. SPICKLER 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
Erik L. Johnson 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, ldaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 799-3073 
I.S.B.N. 5995 
I N  THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE sEco U A L  DISTRICT OF THC 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, I CASE NO. CR2007-0008507 
COMES NOW, Erik L. Johnson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Nez 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID M. ESTES, 
Perce County, State of Idaho, and submits its response objecting to Mr. 
State's Response to Appellant's 
Motion t o  Certify Appeal to the 
Idaho Supreme Court 
Estes' motion to certify this appeal directly to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Mr. Estes bases his motion on Idaho Appellate Rule 12.l(c)(l). Rule 
12.1 is entitled "Permissive appeal in custody cases." This rule addressing 
child custody and Child Protective Act proceedings does not apply to the 
present infraction case. The State respectfully requests that the Court deny 
the motion. 
DATED this Z& day of July, 2008. 
8 0 
State's Response to Appellant's 
Motion to Certify Appeal to the 
Idaho Supreme Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and 
correct copy of the foregoing State's Response to Appellant's Motion to 
Certify Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court was 
(1) - hand delivered, or 
(2) - hand delivered via court basket, or 
(3) - sent via facsimile, or 
(4) mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the 
United States Mail. 
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING: 
David Estes 
1308 loth  venue 
Lewiston, I D  83501 
4- 
DATED this day of July, 2008. 
State's Response to Appellant's 
Motion to Certify Appeal to the 
Idaho Supreme Court 
FILED 
State of Idaho ) Cause NO: CR-2007-0008507 
Plaintiff I Respondent, 
v, ) (Amended ) 
) Motion to Certify Appeal to ldaho 
David M. Estes, ) State Supreme Court 
Defendant I Appellant 
IComes now the defendant. David M. Estes. and moves the court for an order to certify this 
case from the District Court to the ldaho State Supreme Court. 
This motion is based on the following: 
I. Facts 
1.1. On March 10' 2008, the defendant filed an appeal from the Magistrate Division to the 
District court. The parties briefs are complete and the case awaits a hearing date. 
1.2. The main issue in this case is whether a police officer's visual estimation of speed can be 
the sole basis for determining whether an accused should be tried and found guilty of violating 
speed laws 
II. Argument 
2.1 The issues in this case are of general import to all citizens of the State of ldaho which 
requires that the State Supreme Court needs to give guidance on. If this case was left to stand, 
then it would make the use of speed detection devices obsolete and unnecessary. A police 
officer would merely have to stand on the side of the road and obse~e  traffic. He could cite 
Motion to Certify to Supreme Court - 1 David M. Estes 
1308 I OTH AV. 
LEWISTON. ID 
208.746.1744 
David iM. Estes 
1308 I om AV. 
LEWISTON, ID 
208.746.1744 
any motorist that he felt was speeding without independent corroboration. 
For decades, law enforcement has relied on speed detection devices to show that a motorist 
was in violation of speed statutes. Why have police radar if you intend on replacing these 
devices with an officers observations. 
Ill. Authority 
3.1. This motion is based on R.A.P. 12 [a) [b} [ c l. 
IV. Relief Requested 
4.1. The court is asked to enter an order recommending permission to appeal directly to the 
Idaho State Supreme Court. 
Dated this 1' day of August 2008. 
- J 2 & G ? ? - & z ~ ~ ~ & / ~  
David M. Estes, Appellant 





















































Time: 11:22 AM 
Page 1 of 1 
Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County 
Minutes Report 
Case: CR-2007-0008507 
Defendant: Estes, David M 
Selected ltems 
User: TERESA 
Hearing type: Oral Argument 
Assigned judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
Court reporter: Nancy Towier 
Minutes clerk: TERESA 
Prosecutor: Erik L. Johnson 
Defense attorney: [none] 
Minutes date: 08/05/2008 
Start time: 11:OO AM 
End time: 11:21 AM 
Audio tape number: DC# 4115 
Tape Counter: 623 Mr. Johnson and Mr. Estes present. 
Tape Counter: 655 Mr. Estes addresses the Court re: Appellant's Motion to Certify Appeal to Idaho State 
Supreme Court. 
Tape Counter: 717 Court denies Appellant's Motion to Certify Appeal to Idaho State Supreme Court. 
Tape Counter: 723 Mr. Estes presents argument on appeal. 
Tape Counter: 1157 Mr. Johnson presents argument on appeal. 
Tape Counter: 1321 Mr. Estes presents rebuttal argument. 
Tape Counter: 1395 Court takes matter under advisement and will issue written decision. 
Tape Counter: 1399 Court recess. 
COURT MINUTES 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TISE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 CASE NO. CR-07-08507 
PlaintiffIRespondent, 1 
1 ORDER ON APPEAL 
v. 1 
1 
DAVID M. ESTES, 1 
1 
Defendant'Appellmt. ) 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant'Appellant's appeal of the 
Magistrate's determination that Mr. Estes committed the infraction offense of violating 
the posted speed limit'. The Defendant/Appellant, David Estes, proceededpro se in the 
matter. The State of Idaho was represented by Nez Perce County Deputy Prosecutor Erik 
Jolmson. The Court heard oral argument on this matter on August 5,2008. The Court, 
having heard argument and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
' At argument, the Appellant also presented a Motion to Certify Appeal to Idaho State Supreme Court, 
seeking permissive appeal of the issue to the Idaho Supreme Court. This Court, determining the matter was 
not an interlocutory order, denied the motion on the record. 
ORDER ON APPEAL 1$15 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On October 16,2007, Trooper John Feniss of the Idaho State Police issued an 
infraction citation to David Estes for speeding in Nez Perce County, Idaho. Tr. at 5. Mr. 
Estes appeared in court and denied the charge on October 25,2007. A pretrial hearing 
was held on November 20, 2007, and the matter was set for a court trial on December 17, 
2007. On November 29,2007, Mr. Estes filed a motion to disqualify the magistrate 
judge assigned, thus a new judge was assigned and the court trial was rescheduled for 
December 3 1,2007. 
A hearing was held December 3 1,2007, and at that time Mr. Estes made a motion 
to dismiss the matter based upon the State's failure to provide discovery. The motion to 
dismiss was denied, and the matter was once again reset for court trial, to be held on 
March 3,2008. The court trial proceeded on this date, with the State presenting Trooper 
John Ferriss, of the Idaho State Police, as its first witness. Trooper Ferriss first testified 
that he visually estimated Mr. Estes' vehicle traveling 65 miles per hour. See Tr. at 7. 
Trooper Ferriss then testified regarding the radar used to record the speed of the vehicle, 
to which Mr. Estes objected. Upon objection it was revealed that the State provided 
inconect information in discovery. The State provided Mr. Estes information regarding 
the wrong type of speed measuring device. See Tr. at 8-10. At that point, Mr. Estes 
motioned the Court to dismiss the case, to which the State responded that they would like 
to proceed; however, the State would not present information from the radar device used. 
The Court excluded any testimony regarding radar, and the cout trial continued. Tr. at 
10. 
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Trooper Ferriss continued to testify regarding his training in visually estimating 
speed, and then was cross-examined by Mr. Estes. At the conclusion of Trooper Ferris's 
testimony, neither the State nor Mr. Estes elected to call any other witnesses. Tr. at 21- 
22. At that time, the magistrate determined that the State met its burden to prove the 
speeding violation, and assessed a penalty of $75.00. Tr. at 22. Mr. Estes subsequently 
appealed, and the matter is now before this Court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"[Iln Idaho infractions are deemed criminal offenses for purposes of both 
constitutional and statutory analysis . . . ." State v. George, 127 Idaho 693, 698, 905 P.2d 
626, 63 1 (1995). When a criminal action is tried to a court sitting without a jury, 
appellate review of sufficiency of the evidence is limited to ascertaining whether there is 
substantial evidence upon which the magistrate court could have found that the 
prosecution met its burden of proving the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See State v. Bethuieser, 143 Idaho 582,588, 149 P.3d 857, 863 (Ct. 
App. 2006); see also State v. Smith, 139 Idaho 295,298,77 P.3d 984,987 (Ct.App.2003). 
A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder as to 
credibility of the witnesses, the weight of testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from the evidence. Id.; citing State v. Vandenacre, 13 1 Idaho 507,5 10,960 P.2d 
190, 193 (Ct.App.1998); State v. Hickman, 119 Idaho 366, 367, 806 P.2d 959, 960 
(Ct.App. 1991). 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Was there sufficient evidence, based upon the Trooper's visual estimation of 
speed, for the magistrate court to find the prosecution met its burden of proving 
the traffic infraction occurred? 
2. Did the magistrate court's failure to dismiss the infraction violate public policy 
that adjudication of infractions be just, speedy, and inexpensive? 
ANALYSIS 
1. Was there sufficient evidence, based upon the Trooper's visual estimation of 
speed, for the magistrate court to find the prosecution met its burden of 
proving the traffic infraction occurred? 
The magistrate court determined that the State had met its burden of proving that 
the DefendantlAppellant had been traveling in excess of the maximum limit of speed 
posted, in this case, traveling over fifty-five (55) miles per hour, I.C. ?j 49-652(2). The 
magistrate was presented with the testimony of Trooper Ferriss, the officer who wrote the 
infraction citation, and no rebuttal evidence was presented. 
The DefendantlAppellant argues that the magistrate abused his discretion in 
relying on the testimony of Trooper Ferriss, specifically, the Trooper's testimony 
regarding the visual estimate of speed that the DefendantlAppellant was traveling. 
Evidence from the radar device the Trooper employed was excluded on the basis that 
proper discovery was not provided to the Defendant prior to trial. Tr. at 8-10. The 
DefendantlAppellant argues that the criteria set forth in Daubert v. Mevrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) has not 
been met, nor was the Trooper's testimony admissible pursuant to LR.E. 702. 
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In Idaho, the appropriate method for introducing scientific evidence through 
expert testimony is pursuant to I.R.E. 702.~ See State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62,65,844 
P.2d 691, 694 (1992). "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." I.R.E. 702. 
To give expert opinion testimony, a witness must first be qualified as 
an expert on the matter at hand. See IHC Hosp., Inc. v. Board of 
Commissioners, 108 Idaho 136,697 P.2d 1150 (1985); I.R.E. 702. 
Whether a witness is sufficiently qualified as an expert is a matter largely 
within the discretion of the trial court. Sidwell v. William Prym, Inc., 112 
Idaho 76,730 P.2d 996 (1986). Once the witness is qualified as an 
This Court recognizes that our neighboring state, Washington, takes a slightly different approach to its 
interpretation of its similar rule of evidence, and employs the test set forth in Frye v. UnitedStates, 54 
App.D.C. 46,47,293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923) in addition to its application of the rule of evidence. 
Unless an exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of the particular technique makes its use 
prejudicial or likely to mislead the jury, the better approach is to admit all relevant scientific 
evidence in the same manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by 
cross examination or refutation. Clark 762 P.2d at 856. The evidentiaty rule relied on in Clark, 
Montana Rule of Evidence 702, is identical to Fed.R.Evid. 702 and Washington's ER 702. All 
three state: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion 
or otherwise. A conclusion similar to Clark was reached in State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 844 
P.2d 691, 694 (1992), wherein the court reaffirmed the plurality opinion in Garrett. Garrett held 
the appropriate test for measuring the scientific reliability of evidence, including HGN evidence, 
is Idaho Rule of Evidence 702, not Frye. A similar result has been reached in Oregon under 
Oregon evidentiary rules. See State v. Brown, 297 Or. 404,687 P.2d 751 (1984); Oregon v. 
O'Key, 123 0r.App. 54, 858 P.2d 904 (1993); State v. Reed, 83 0r.App. 451, 732 P.2d 66 
(1987). 
Although Washington recognizes that other jurisdictions have rejected Frye in favor of a 
more liberal test of admissibility based on the relevance standard of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, it nevertheless has continued to employ Frye when determining the admissibility of 
evidence based on novel scientific procedures. State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash.2d 879, 886,846 
P.2d 502 (1993). Cauthron was decided prior to Daubertv. MerreN Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 
U.S. 579, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Daubert held the "general acceptance" 
standard of Frye does not govern trials conducted under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under 
Fed.R.Evid. 702, if a witness qualifies as an expert, the merits and demerits of a particular 
scientific test, approach or procedure are simply matters for the jury to sort out. However, until 
such time as our Supreme Court abandons Frye and interprets ER 702 in the same manner as 
Daubert interpreted Fed.R.Evid. 702, we are bound by Cauthron and previous decisions. 
State v. Cissne, 72 Wash. App. 677,685-686, 865 P.2d 564,568-569 (Wash. App. 1994). The Cissne 
Court correctly sets forth the distinction between Washington and Idaho law on this issue. In Idaho, 
the determination of admissibility is pursuant to I.R.E. 702. 
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expert, the trial court must determine whether such expert opinion 
testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence. Id.; 
I.R.E. 702. If the testimony is thus competent and relevant, it may be 
admissible; the weight given to the testimony is left to the trier of fact. 
IHC Hosp., Inc. v. Board of Commissioners, supra. The admissibility of 
expert opinion testimony is discretionary with the trial court and will not 
be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Sidwell v. William 
Prym, Inc., supra. 
State v. Hopkins, 113 ldaho 679,680-681,747 P.2d 88, 89-90 (Ct. App. 1987). 
The magistrate court did not abuse his discretion in allowing Trooper Ferriss to 
testify as to his determination of the DefendantIAppellant's speed of travel based upon 
his training and experience in visually estimating the speed of a traveling vehicle. 
In addition, the magistrate court did not err in finding that the 
DefendantlAppellant was traveling at a speed above the maximum speed limit. There 
was sufficient evidence before the magistrate to support this determination. Trooper 
Ferris' testimony that the DefendantlAppellant was traveling over the speed limit was 
sufficient evidence to support the court's determination3. Further, no evidence was 
submitted to suggest that the DefendantlAppellant was traveling at or below the posted 
speed limit. Therefore, the magistrate's finding that the DefendantlAppellant violated the 
posted speed limit is affirmed. 
2. Did the magistrate court's failure to dismiss the infraction violate public 
policy that adjudication of infractions be just, speedy, and inexpensive? 
The DefendantlAppellant argues that the magistrate court erred by failing to 
dismiss the infraction when the adjudication of the matter failed to be just, speedy, and 
inexpensive. The infraction in question was issued on October 16,2007. The matter 
When silting in an appellate capacity, this Court is precluded from substituting its judgment for that of the 
fact finder regarding credibility of witnesses, the weight of testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn eom the evidence. State v. Bettwieser, 143 Idaho 582, 588, 149 P.3d 857, 863 (Ct. App. 2006); 
Stafe v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507,510,960 P.2d 190, 193 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Hickman, 119 ldaho 
366,367, 806 P.2d 959,960 (Ct. App. 1991). 
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came before the magistrate for a court trial on March 3,2008. The matter was originally 
set for court trial on December 17, 2007; however, this date was vacated and reset 
following the DefendanVAppellant's motion to disqualify the judge. Upon appointment 
of the current magistrate judge, the matter was set for trial on December 3 1, 2007. On 
that date, the DefendantiAppellant filed a motion to dismiss based upon the State's failure 
to provide adequate discovery. Following argument regarding discovery on December 
3 1,2007, the matter was then set for trial on March 3,2008, allowing adequate time for 
all discovery issues to be resolved in the matter. 
I.C. 19-3501 sets forth time limits for the prosecution of felony and 
misdemeanor criminal cases. This section "makes no provision for infractions which are 
prosecuted by filing a citation or a written complaint pursuant to Idaho Infraction Rule 
3(a), (b)." State V. Burtlow, 144 Idaho 455,457, 163 P.3d 244, 246 (Ct. App. 2007). 
Neither do the Idaho Infraction Rules set forth a requirement that infractions be 
prosecuted under a required timeline such as that set forth in I.C. 5 19-3501. 
Further, the DefendantiAppellant supports his argument by reliance on a case 
from the State of Washington, City ofKirkland v. Ellis, 82 Wa. App. 819,920 P.2d 206 
(1996). The DefendanVAppellant urges this Court to follow the policy he argues is set 
forth in this case, namely that Washington State Infraction Rules shall be construed to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every infraction case. Kivkland 
is distinguishable from the case at hand for several reasons. First, as stated above, the 
Idaho Infraction Rules do not provide a time limit for the prosecution of infractions. 
Second, the facts of City of Kirkland v. Ellis differ from the case before this 
Court. In the Washington case, the defendants in question were cited for speeding. Id. at 
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822,920 P.2d at 208. Each defendant sought to contest their respective tickets, and each 
sought to have the presence of the radar technician at their contested hearings. Id. at 823, 
920 P.2d at 209. The defendants were told they only needed to submit their requests for 
the technician's presence in writing. Id. At the time of the contested hearings, no radar 
technicians were available or present. Id. The district court judge continued the 
hearings, to which each of the defendants objected, arguing the continuance was unfair 
because the defendants would be required to miss another day of work and the 
continuance was solely due to the City's error of not providing the technicians. Id. 
Following the grant of continuance, the defendants sought a writ of 
mandamus/prohibition from the Washington Superior Court. The writ was granted and 
the Washington state district court was prohibited from presiding at the contested 
hearings and mandated to dismiss the infraction cases without prejudice. Id. 
On appeal, the Washington Appellate Court determined that the Superior Court 
did not err in issuing the writ as the defendants had no adequate remedy at law to 
challenge the district court's determination at that time4. Id. at 829, 920 P.2d at 212. 
Also at issue was whether a continuance was appropriate, based upon the City's unclear 
procedures that a defendant must follow to ensure a radar technician would be present at 
the contested hearing. Id. at 830, 920 P.2d at 212. The Appellate Court concluded "that 
the City failed to exercise due diligence and that no good cause for a continuance existed. 
Accordingly, the continuance was not 'necessary' as required by IRLJ 6.6(c) and the trial 
judge exceeded his authority by granting the continuance." Id. at 83 1,920 P.2d at 213. 
4 The defendants' cases arose prior to a change in Washington law. At the time of these cases, traffic 
inkaction cases were not subject to appellate review under the Washington Rules for Appeal of Decisions 
of Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (RALJ), but instead were governed by the Washington Civil Rules for 
Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (CRLJ). Thus, the defendants' cases were generally reviewable by a lrial de 
novo in Superior Court. Id. at 825,920 P.2d at 210. 
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In the case before this Court, the DefendadAppellant has not shown that the 
magistrate erred when he continued the hearing until March 3,2008. The Court is 
sympathetic to the Defendant/Appellant in that the matter was not quickly resolved, 
however, there is no showing that the case should have been dismissed rather than 
continueds. Therefore, the magistrate's decision to continue the case is affirmed.6 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant, David Estes, was issued a traffic citation for traveling beyond the 
maximum posted speed limit. Following a court trial, the magistrate court determined 
that the State had provided sufficient evidence that Mr. Estes was speeding. Mr. Estes 
appealed the magistfate's determination on two issues: first, whether there was sufficient 
evidence, based upon the Trooper's visual determination of speed alone, to establish that 
Mr. Estes was speeding, and second, whether the magistrate erred by continuing the trial 
date until March 3,2008. Based upon the foregoing analysis, the magistrate's 
determination is affirmed. 
* in comparison, the matter did proceed to trial within six months, which is the time limit required for 
bringing a felony case to trial, should the trial not be postponed upon application of the Defendant. The 
Court is cognizant that much of the delay in this matter was due to the Prosecution's failure to provide 
discovery information, however, some of the delay also occurred when the DefendantlAppellant sought to 
disqualify the frst magistrate judge assigned the case. Regardless, the DefendanUAppellant has not 
established that the magistrate erred by continuing the matter until the March 3,2008 court trial date. 
The DefendantlAppellant also sought reasonable fees should he prevail on this matter. Because the 
magistrate's determinations are affmned by this Court, it is unnecessary to address the matter of fees. 
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ORDER 
The magistrate's determination in the foregoing matter is hereby AFFIRMED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
4 DATED this c2fl ay of September 2008 
r, 
CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER ON APPEAL was: 
\/hand delivered via court basket, or 
MOC- 
mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this 2day 
of September, 2008, to: 
David M. Estes MCM 
1308 10" Ave 
Lewiston ID 83501 
Erik Johnson 
Deputy Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston ID 83501 
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IN AND FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
itate of Idaho ) Appellate NO: 
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)avid M. Estes, j Notice of Appeal 
Defendant I Appellant ) 
.O: The Clerk of Courts Nez Perce County ldaho 
(ND TO: Erik L. Johnson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Nez Perce County, ldaho 
.o you and each of you take note that the appellant, David M. Estes, files this notice of 
~ppeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of ldaho In and For 
1e County of Nez perce. 
I. Title of Court 
.I. Court - The appeal was heard in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of 
be State of ldaho in and For the County of Nez Perce, Judge Carl B. Kerrick presiding. 
II. Cause Number 
!.I. Case Number - The case number assigned to the cause is: CR-2007-0008507 
Ill. Parties 
1.1. Parties - (1) David M. Estes is pro se and is the Appellant. 
(2) The Plaintii, State of Idaho, was represented by Erik Johnson, 
Deputy Prosecutor for Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
Jotice of Appeal - 1 David M. Estes 
1 308 10" AV. 
LEWISTON, ID 
208.746.1744 
IV. Judgments Appealed From 






deferred payment agreement. There was no separate 
judgment entered. 
V. Issues 
3.1. Judgments Appealed from - (1) The appellant appeals the final order issued by Judge 
Carl B. Kerrick on September 2"d, 2008 pertaining to Nez 
Perce County Case CR - 2007- 0008507 
5.1 Should the State of ldaho allow Courts to convict defendants based solely on the visual 
estimation of speed of police officers without corroborating those estimates using speed 
detection devices or other scientific methods? 








State of ldaho the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick is not requested. A transcript of the hearing held 
Vl. Right of Appeal 
6.1. This appeal is based on Appellate Rule 11 (c). 
VII. Transcript 
35 before the Honorable Jay Gaskill, Magistrate, in the magistrate court in the District Court of the 3 4 ~  I 
8.1. All records automatically included pursuant to Court Rule 28. 






Second Judicial District of the State of ldaho is requested to be sent with this appeal. 
Vlll Designation of Documents. 
David M. Estes 



















8.2. Transcript of proceedings under Cause CR 2007-0008507 from a hearing on March 3", 
2008 before the Honorable Jay Gaskill in the Magistrate Division of the District of Court of Nez 
Perce County. 







a. The trial transcript of proceedings held before the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick on 
18 l71 I 
8.4. Brief of the Respondent filed in Cause NO: CR 2007-0008507 filed June 11" ,2008. 





August 5" 2008 has not been ordered and no fee payment is needed. 
b. That ail filing fees and fees for preparation of documents have not been paid pending 
I certify: 
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37 STATE OF IDAHO I I 38 SS 
a motion for permission to proceed in forrna pauperis. 
c. Sewice has been made upon all parties required to be sewed pursuant to Rule 20. 
Dated this 13" day of October 2008. 
39 COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE : 
40 I I 
41 1 David M. Estes, being sworn, deposes and says: 
42 I / 
43 That I am the appellant in the above-entitled appeal and that all statements in this notice of 
44 I I 
David M. Estes 
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of appeal are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
- .T~~ f~ .&~k21e f~  
David M. Estes, Appellant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13' Day of October, 2008. 
Notary 4- 
Residing at: &a-3 t>d% s \ . 
&.cu:ah-. z~. S3sel
MY ~ornmission expires: 9-/a -2"1$/ 
TRACEY RUSSELL 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
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I, DeAnna P. Grimm, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of 
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
the County of Nez Perce, do hereby certify that the foregoing 
Clerk's Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound 
by me and contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, 
documents, and papers designated to be included under Rule 28, 
Idaho Appellate Rules, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross- 
Appeal, and additional documents that were requested. 
I further certify: 
1. That no exhibits were marked for identification or 
admitted into evidence during the course of this action. 
2. That the following will be submitted as an exhibit to 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
this record on appeal: 
Transcript of Proceedings filed April 9, 2008 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of said court this / day of December 2008. 
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk 
Deputy Clerk 
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I, DeAnna P. Grimm, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of 
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
the County of Nez Perce, do hereby certify that copies of the 
Clerk's Recora were placed in the United States mail and 
addressed to Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, P. 0 
Box 83720. Boise. Idaho 83720-0010 and David M. Estes. 1308 loth 
Avenue, Lewiston, ID 83501 this day of 
m7 
2688. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of the said Court this / 3 day of 
PATTY 0. WEEKS 
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